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DOES THE FINANCIAL DISTRESS FACTOR DRIVE THE MOMENTUM ANOMALY?
The existence of medium term continuation of stock returns (momentum) is widely accepted in both the academic literature and in the professional investment community. There are several competing explanations for this most challenging of all anomalies (Fama (1998) ). The first is risk based (e.g., Chan (1988) , Ball and Kothari (1989) , Zarowin (1990) , Conrad and Kaul (1998) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) . Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001 ) and other studies (e.g., Daniel and Titman (1999) and Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) ) argue momentum is driven by underreaction to information. Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) provide a market microstructure argument that apparent momentum profits are explained by sma ll firm transaction costs. The usual criticism of data mining also applies (Lo and MacKinlay (1990) ).
Several behavioral models based on inherent biases in the way investors process information have also been proposed to explain medium term continuation of returns. In Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) , investors are slow to update their beliefs in response to new public information leading to underreaction, and this generates positive autocorrelation in stock returns.
In Hong and Stein (1999) , not all investors receive the same information at the same time and, in addition, investors are unable to extract fully other investors' private information from market prices. As news slowly diffuses among the wider investing public, stock prices also adjust slowly leading to underreaction to new information and positive autocorrelations. The empirical results of Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) provide evidence supportive of this. Daniel and Titman (1999) find a significant momentum effect for growth stocks and no effect for value stocks. They explain this in terms of overconfidence -growth stocks are more difficult to value and we are more overconfident when faced with more demanding tasks. The behavioral literature thus suggests that firms where there is likely to be greater information asymmetry (e.g., those not followed by many analysts or difficult to value) should exhibit a greater momentum effect.
One such category is that of financially distressed firms. Judging the solvency position of a firm is not any easy task for an investor. As such, there is greater likelihood of heterogeneous beliefs with underlying information diffusing only slowly in the market following the trades of more informed investors. Thus, following the gradual information diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) , distressed firms would have low prior returns with the market only slowly adjusting to their true financial position, and such low returns would continue for some time into the future. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) find that high Ohlson (1980) O-score (high bankruptcy risk) firms are smaller firms with low analyst coverage and weak current earnings. They argue that such firms suffer from a high degree of information asymmetry and, as such, are mispriced.
By this argument, we would expect the momentum effect to be stronger for distressed firms (which are generally smaller and have lower analyst coverage) than for non-distressed firms.
The existing literature has attempted to explain returns on small size stocks and high B/M stocks by linking size and B/M effects to financial distress (see for instance Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1992) ).
1 However, Dichev (1998) Following Fama and French (1993, 1995) we define the term distress factor as representing individual firm financial distress. As such, we use the terms financial distress and bankruptcy risk interchangeably.
that even though financially constrained firms have characteristics associated with higher returns (high leverage, high B/M, high prior year returns), they earn lower returns than non-constrained firms. Though their ind ex does not directly measure financial distress, financially constrained firms are more likely to face financial distress than non-constrained firms. Ferguson and Shockley (2003) also find distressed firms earn lower returns. However, Vassalou and Xing (2004) find contrary results using a problematic option-based model for assessing probability of default (see Bharath and Shumway, 2004) .
Whereas there is an extensive literature on momentum and a developing literature on the distress factor, we are not aware of any study that has directly studied the important question of a potential link between the two issues. However, there are several studies with highly suggestive evidence. Beaver (1968) first demonstrated subsequently bankrupt firms underperform the market for up to four years prior to bankruptcy, and particularly during the last year, when they underperform by 32%. This suggests that the market is anticipating, but not fully incorporating, the deteriorating financial health of a firm and distressed firms, therefore, experience lower past realized returns. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) and Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) find most of momentum profits come from the returns continuation of poor performers. If the market is underreacting to the poor solvency position of firms, we would expect financially distressed firms to be poor past performers and be driving the momentum effect.
Given the high risk of failure of such financially distressed firms, we may expect differential market pricing effects in up and down markets. There is a substantial body of literature showing factor risk premia are not stationary but vary over time (e.g., Jagannathan and Wang (1996) , Ang and Chen (2002)). Ang and Chen demonstrate asymmetric correlations in good and bad states of the world. Specifically, they find correlations between portfolio returns and market returns are much higher in downmarkets than they are in upmarkets both for smaller stocks and for high B/M stocks thereby exposing investors to greater losses in bad states of the world. Similarly, Zhang and Petkova (2004) find conditional betas of smaller stocks and high B/M stocks co-vary positively with the expected risk premium. Bhardwaj and Brooks (1993) , Ahmed and Lockwood (1998) and Howton and Peterson (1998) , among othe rs, find that there are significant differences in systematic risks in bull and bear markets. We explicitly consider the potential impact of such factors on our analysis.
This paper explores directly the potential relationship between momentum and distress risk in the London market with bankruptcy risk measured by a widely-used UK-based z-score model (Taffler (1983 (Taffler ( , 1984 akin to Altman (1968)). We also extend our analysis to consider the time varying nature of distress risk premia and momentum returns. Our main results are that (i) the momentum effect in stock returns can be explained by distress risk, (ii) this relationship is particularly strong in bear market conditions, and (iii) in contrast to the arguments of Fama and French (1993, 1995) , among others, and consistent with Dichev (1998), there is no evidence to suggest size and B/M are capturing bankruptcy risk.
The paper is organized as follows: section I describes our data and methodology, section II describes our results assuming constant risk premia, section III describes our results under different states of the world and section IV provides robustness checks. Concluding section V provides a summary and discussion of our findings.
I. Data and Methodology
A. Sample Selection
This study covers all non-finance industry UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) at any time during the period 1979-2002. 2 If a company changes industry or exchange of listing, it enters the respective portfolio only after it has been listed on the (main)
London Stock Exchange and/or is classified as non-financial for twenty-four months. If the exchange and/or industry change during the holding period, returns after the change are deleted.
To be included in the sample, securities are required to meet three additional conditions:
1. they should have positive book value because interpretation of negative book-to-market ratios is problematic. This does not impose any significant bias till 1990 as the number of negative book value firms until then is small (between 1 and 14 a year). However, during the 1990s, the number of such firms increases ranging from 28 to 53 a year. Almost all negative book value firms have bankrupt z-scores. The number of firms excluded is high in the first two years of our sample period and thereafter ranges between 11 and 42 a year. However, the number of financially distressed firms excluded on this criterion is not disproportionately high.
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The UK bankruptcy regime differs significantly to Chapter XI in the US and it is very rare indeed for stockholders to receive any terminal distribution. In fact there was only one case in our sample period, Railtrack, in which equity holders were promised (by the government) any payout after all creditor claims were met.
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We choose September 30 th rather than June 30 th as the portfolio formation date because unlike in the US, in the UK year-ends are more diffuse. While 37% of the companies in our sample have December year-ends, about the same number of companies have year-ends between January and April with approximately 22% of the companies having March year-ends.
B. Data
We use z-score as a proxy for distress risk. Following Altman (1968) , the z-score of a firm is derived as a weighted sum of a set of pre-defined accounting ratios. Firms with z-scores above a pre-determined cut-off rarely fail while the incidence of failure is high in firms with zscores below this cut-off. The UK -based z-score model of Taffler (1983 Taffler ( , 1984 employed in this study is derived in a similar way to Altman (1968) using a discriminant modeling approach. Using this bankruptcy model, a firm with a computed z<0 has a financial profile more similar to previous bankrupt firms and thus itself is at a risk of bankruptcy, whereas z>0 indicates a firm 
C. Methodology
To study the link between momentum and bankruptcy risk we need to control for the potential impact of size and book-to-market on the pricing of distressed firms. Therefore, we form twenty-four portfolios as follows:
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At the end of September of each year we first rank firms on their market capitalization and group them into two portfolios using the median as the break point. The stocks are then independently ranked on B/M and grouped into three portfolios -one with the lowest 30%, one with the middle 40% and one with the highest 30% B/M ratios. Securities are then separately ranked on momentum and grouped into two portfolios using the median as the break point and, finally, the stocks are independently ranked on z-score and grouped into two portfolios -one with negative z-score stocks and the other with positive z-score stocks. Twenty-four size, B/M, 6 LSPD provides monthly returns as natural logarithms of returns adjusted for capital changes and dividends. The returns are converted to simple arithmetic returns using the transformation: exp(ln(R t ))-1.
We do not form portfolios by ranking the stocks on z-scores, as with Dichev (1998), because z-score is, in effect, a binary pattern recognition device that classifies firms into two categories: those with high risk of bankruptcy and those with low (negligible) risk. The actual value of the z-score, per se, does not convey much information about the financial state of a firm and the only meaningful distinction is between those with z-scores below and above the cut-off point (for the model used here, 0). momentum and z-score portfolios are then formed at the intersections of the two market capitalization, three B/M portfolios, two momentum and two z-score portfolios.
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To test whether momentum is capturing bankruptcy risk, we employ Fama-MacBeth 
Where:
Rit is the equally-weighted return on portfolio i during month t R Ft is the 1-month Treasury bill rate at the beginning of month t β it-1 is the beta of portfolio i estimated at the portfolio formation date 10 ln(size it-1 ) is the natural logarithm of average market capitalization of common equity of stocks in portfolio i at the portfolio formation date ln(B/M it-1 ) is the natural logarithm of the average of B/M ratios of stocks in portfolio i at the 8 Fama (1998) points out that the results of many return predictability studies are sensitive to the trading rules employed. To test the robustness of our results we repeat all our analyses using an alternative portfolio formation method which avoids potential data-snooping bias (Lo and MacKinlay (1990) ). Twenty-four size, B/M and z -score portfolios are formed at the intersections of the independently sorted four market capitalization, three B/M and two z-score portfolios. Results are essentially identical to our main findings and thus not reported here to save space.
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Throughout this paper, subscript 't' represents time of portfolio formation and subscript 't-1' shows that the information is available at the time of portfolio formation.
10
We estimate portfolio beta by regressing monthly excess returns over the previous twenty-four months (before portfolio formation) on each portfolio against monthly excess returns on an equally-weighted market index. We use Dimson's (1979) method with one lead and one lag to reduce problems of thin trading.
portfolio formation date. The B/M ratio of each stock is computed as book value of equity (excluding preference capital) plus deferred taxes less minority interests divided by the market capitalization at the time of portfolio formation. To avoid undue influence of outliers on the regressions, the smallest and largest 1% of observations are set equal to 0.01 and 0.99 fractiles respectively.
Mom it-1 is the average monthly raw return over the eleven months from October year t-1 to August year t for all the stocks in portfolio i z(0/1) it-1 = 1 if the latest available z-score is negative, 0 otherwise, and eit is a mean-zero stochastic error term.
II. Results with constant risk premia
In this section, we first show z-score predicts bankruptcy and then present preliminary evidence on the relationship between prior-year returns, z-scores, size, B/M and failure rates. We also provide some summary statistics before reviewing the results of our analysis relating to whether momentum is capturing distress risk.
A. Is z-score a valid measure of bankruptcy risk?
In our sample, the mortality rate (delisting for any reason) is much higher in firms with negative z-scores than firms with positive z-scores. Approximately 9.4% of all negative z-score firms are delisted within the next twelve months while the mortality rate for positive z-score firms is almost half at 5.1%. The difference in proportions is highly significant (z = 11.5). Also, out of 200 actual bankruptcies, only 9 firms are misclassified as solvent by their z-scores derived on the basis of last available annual accounts. Our sample comprises of 5,466 firm years with negative z-scores and 17,308 firm years with positive z-scores. The conditional probability of failure given a negative z-score is 3.49% and is significantly different to the base failure rate of 0.88% (z = 20.7). Similarly, the conditional probability of non-failure given a positive z-score is 99.95% and is significantly different to the base rate of 99.12% (z = 11.7). 11 As such, our z-score variable constitutes a valid ex-ante measure of corporate bankruptcy risk.
B. Momentum, z-scores and failure rates
To unearth the potential relation between momentum, size, B/M and distress factor, we form the following additional portfolios using two-way sorts:
(1) We rank firms on z-score and group them into two portfolios -one with negative z-score stocks and the other with positive z-score stocks. Securities are then independently ranked on their prior 11-month returns, i.e. from October year t-1 to August year t, and grouped into ten portfolios with approximately equal numbers of securities. Twenty portfolios are then formed at the intersections of z-score and momentum.
(2) We rank firms on z-score and group them into two portfolios -one with negative z-score stocks and the other with positive z-score stocks. Securities are then independently ranked on their market capitalization on the 30 th September of each year and grouped into ten portfolios with approximately equal numbers of securities. Twenty portfolios are then formed at the intersections of z-score and market capitalization.
11 Including negative B/M stocks, our sample contains 214 cases firm bankruptcy of which, again, only 9 have z>0 on the basis of their last accounts. Our firm population now comprises of 5,896 firm years with negative z-scores and 17,363 firm years with positive z-scores. The conditional probability of failure given a negative z-score is 3.48%, and is significantly different to the base failure rate of 0.92% (z = 20.6). Similarly, the conditional probability of non-failure given a positive z-score is 99.95%, and is significantly different to the base rate of 99.14% (z = 11.5). The table provides some preliminary evidence that low prior-year return firms, smaller firms and high B/M firms are more likely to fail and, therefore, have higher financial distress risk. However, it also raises the prospect of there being some interaction between these variables. Table 1 here Table 2 presents the distribution of failures and failure rates for our twenty-four portfolios formed on size, B/M, momentum, and z-score. It shows that for negative z-score stocks, controlling for size and B/M, low momentum stocks are more likely to fail than high momentum stocks while controlling for size and momentum, high B/M stocks are more likely to fail than low B/M stocks only for small size, low momentum portfolios. Interestingly, 43% of the failures are negative z-score, low momentum small stocks with high B/M ratios, while such stocks constitute just 5.3% of our sample. Importantly, though, the z-score effect is significant in four of the five low momentum deciles but is not significant for higher momentum deciles. These results are consistent with momentum and distress risk being related to each other. Positive z-score stocks significantly outperform negative z-score stocks but only when prior-year returns are low.
Panel B shows, controlling for size, the average B/M of distressed stocks is higher than for non-distressed stocks for all but the two smallest size deciles. Contrary to the evidence of Vassalou and Xing (2004) , the size effect is much stronger for non-distressed stocks (1.88% per month, t = 4.58) than for distressed stocks (1.17% per month, t = 2.30). Also, the difference between the returns on distressed (z<0) and non-distressed (z>0) stocks for the two smallest size deciles is statistically insignificant (t = 1.59 and 1.36 respectively), showing that the z-score effect is not being driven by very small stocks. Nonetheless, the three size deciles with strongest z-score effect are still quite small with average market capitalization of under £50 million ($90 million) and trading costs could be substantial for these deciles. Consistent with the predictions of Hong and Stein's (1999) slow information diffusion hypothesis, distressed stocks have much lower prior year returns than non-distressed stocks in smaller size portfolios (1 -4) but have higher prior year returns for decile size portfolios 5 -10. Controlling for size, distressed stocks do not appear to be less risky than non-distressed stocks as they also have higher betas than nondistressed stocks for all size deciles.
Finally, Panel C shows controlling for B/M, non-distressed stocks are larger than distressed stocks. Distressed stocks have higher betas than non-distressed stocks for every B/M decile, and there is an inverse and almost monotonic relationship between B/M and past year returns. Particularly interesting are the prior-year returns for the highest B/M decile -these are almost zero for non-distressed stocks and negative for distressed stocks. Contrary to the distress factor hypothesis of Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1992) , the B/M effect is not being driven by distressed stocks (0.30% per month, t = 0.75) while it is significant for nondistressed stocks (1.13% per month, t = 3.63). Contrary to Griffin and Lemmon (2002), we find our z-score effect is independent of B/M.
Table 3 here
To explore the relation between z-score, prior-year returns, size and B/M in more detail, 
Table 4 here
Thus, table 4 provides preliminary evidence of the momentum effect being driven by distressed stocks once the effects of size and B/M on stock returns are controlled for. Panels C and D show we are largely successful in controlling for size and B/M effects in our portfolio sorts, although not in every case. Panel E shows higher stock return variability for distressed stocks: such stocks earn lower prior-year returns than non-distressed stocks for low momentum portfolios and higher prior-year returns for high momentum portfolios. Distressed stocks also have higher betas than non-distressed stocks suggesting they are riskier, even though they subsequently earn lower returns. Table 5 presents the results for our Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-section regressions for the twenty-four portfolios formed on four-way sorts using equation (1). It shows that negative zscore stocks earn lower returns than positive z-score stocks and the coefficient on the z-score binary measure becomes stronger when size, B/M and momentum are present in the pricing equation.
D. The relation between momentum and distress risk: regression evidence
12 Table 5 here
The results show that, conditional on beta, size, B/M and prior-year returns, negative zscore portfolios underperform positive z-score portfolios by 31 basis points per month, a difference that is statistically significant at the 5% level (t = 2.55). There is no evidence of any size effect, while high B/M stocks outperform low B/M stocks by 38 basis points per month, a difference that is statistically significant at the 1% level (t = 3.44). The presence of z-score in the pricing equation has no influence on either of the size or B/M coefficients indicating there is no common variation between financial distress risk, size or B/M that is linked to stock returns. The coefficient on mome ntum is 13 basis points per month (t = 3.39) when z-score is excluded from the pricing equation. Importantly, the coefficient on momentum becomes statistically insignificant (6 basis points; t = 1.43) when z-score is included in the pricing equation. These results strongly suggest momentum is proxying for distress risk, when the distress factor is not included in the asset pricing model. When it is added, the momentum factor is no longer significant.
III. Is the relation between momentum and financial distress risk conditional?
Our results so far suggest that bankruptcy risk is driving the stock return momentum effect. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) show that momentum is only manifest in up -market conditions and, based on this, they argue that it is a priced risk factor. In this section we explore whether the relation between prior-year returns and distress risk holds across different market conditions and different states of the business cycle.
A. Momentum, financial distress risk and expected market re turns
If momentum and z-score are truly related factors, their regression coefficients will covary as the state of the market changes. To test whether the unconditional findings of section II hold conditionally we run separate cross-section regressions for up-and down-markets using equation (1).
Authors typically use ex-post realized market returns as conditioning variables for state of the market. 13 However, Zhang and Petkova (2004) show that this approach is theoretically and methodologically incorrect. We therefore employ expected market returns generated by a macroeconomic forecasting model as conditioning variables. Jagannathan and Wang (1996) use change in labor income and default risk premium in their conditional asset pricing model. Since there is no index for yields on corporate bonds, we use the difference between 3-month T-Bill yield and 3-month LIBOR to proxy for default premium. Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) use a proxy for term structure of interest rates defined as the difference between yields on 10-year and 1-year government bonds. Since, in the UK, these yields are not available before 1984, we use the difference between 10-year UK government nominal spot rate and 1-year UK government nominal spot rate to proxy for the term structure. Following Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), we also use dividend yield on the FTSE All Share index and 3-month T-Bill yield.
Our expected returns macroeconomic forecasting model is thus given by: R Mt+1 = α + β 1 labor t + β 2 yield t + β 3 divyld t + β 4 term t + β 5 prem t + ε t+1 (2) Where:
R Mt+1 is the month t+1 realized return on an equally-weighted market index labor t is the monthly change in economy-wide average income (seasonally adjusted) for month t yield t is the yield on the 3-month T-Bill at the end of month t divyld t is the dividend yield on the FTSE All Share index at the end of month t term t is the difference between government securities' 10-year zero rate and 1-year zero rate at the end of month t premt is the difference between 3-month T-Bill yield and 3-month LIBOR at the end of month t, and e it+1 is a mean-zero stochastic error term.
Using the derived coefficients from fitting equation (2) we estimate the next month expected market return and divide our 276 months into those with lowest 25% expected market return (down-market conditions) and those with highest 25% expected market return (up -market conditions). Table 6 provides parallel results to table 5 for our Fama-Macbeth (1973) cross-section regressions of equation (1) but now bifurcated into lowest quartile expected market return and highest quartile expected market return portfolios.
Table 6 here
The table shows that negative z-score stocks underperform positive z-score stocks in both states of the market. When z-score is excluded from the pricing equation, momentum is manifested during both states of the market. During down-market months, it is 15 basis points (t = 2.23) and is reduced to zero by introduction of z-score into the pricing equation. In up -market conditions, introduction of z-score reduces momentum from 19 basis points per month (t = 2.18) to a statistically insignificant 12 basis points per month (t = 1.47). 14 Momentum is "driven out" by zscore in both states of the market. Our results reinforce the evidence presented earlier, size and B/M are distinct from distress risk while momentum is no longer significant, both unconditionally and conditionally, when z-score is included in the cross-section regressions.
14 There is no significant z-score effect (5 basis points per month, t=0.39) in the middle two expected market return quartiles.
B. Momentum, financial distress risk and the state of the economy
In this sub -section we investigate the relation between momentum and financial distress risk in different economic states. Any bankruptcy risk premium is likely to vary with the state of the economy because poorly performing or distressed firms should be especially sensitive to economic conditions with their stock returns being affected by common macro-economic factors such as credit squeezes, liquidity crunches or flight towards quality. Financially distressed firms are likely to be abl e to prosper better when periods of high economic growth are expected.
However, they will be harder hit when economic conditions are poor.
We use next quarter GDP growth rate as an indicator of the state of the economy based on evidence that the stock market seems to lead GDP growth rate by at least a quarter (Fama (1981), Ogden (2003)). 15 We compute the quarterly long-run average GDP growth rate from 1955 to 2003 and divide the quarters into those with best 25% GDP growth rate and those with worst 25% GDP growth rate. We then divide our 276 sample months according to the state of the economy (i.e., whether the next quarter GDP growth rate is among the best 25% or worst 25%) and conduct Fama -MacBeth (1973) regressions separately for good and bad states of the economy employing asset pricing equation (1). The results are presented in table 7. in different economic states of the world, momentum is subsumed by z-score and thus mainly driven by the distress factor conditionally, as well as unconditionally.
V. Concluding remarks
The primary contribution of this paper is to provide a potential distress factor explanation for the momentum anomaly. We also explore the impact of different states of the world on factor risk premia and extend existing work on the market pricing of the distress risk factor using U.K.
capital markets-based data.
The distress factor hypothesis states that small size firms and high B/M firms are relatively distressed and these factors capture the distress risk missed by the market factor. We find that, contrary to the distress factor hypothesis, financially distressed stocks earn lower returns than non-distressed stocks and size, B/M and z-scores are unrelated to each other. Dichev (1998) and Ferguson and Shockley (2003) reach the same conclusion with their data, but 16 As with expected market returns, there is also no significant z-score effect (-26 basis points per month, t=1.51) in the middle two next quarter GDP growth rate quartiles. (2000) and Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) find that the momentum effect is driven by return continuation of poor performers and, consistent with their results, we find distressed stocks (poor past performers) earn lower subsequent returns. These results are hard to reconcile with rational asset pricing as distressed stocks are riskier on conventional measures (have higher betas, higher B/Ms, and are smaller). Further, contrary to any risk story, distressed stocks do not outperform in good states of world. Importantly, we find momentum is subsumed by z-score showing the momentum effect is driven by the distress factor effect. As such, we conclude that a financial distress factor should replace momentum in the standard Carhart (1997) four-factor asset pricing equation. At the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2001, all the stocks in our sample are allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available z-score is positive or negative. Z-scores are computed using the discriminant model of Taffler (1983 Taffler ( , 1984 and firms with negative z-scores have a higher risk of financial distress. To minimize the look ahead bias, a five month lag between the balance sheet date and reporting date is assumed. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of September each year. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 % of negative z-score firms Table 1 : Failure rates in two -way portfolios Portfolios in panel A are formed as follows: at the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2001, all the stocks in our sample are allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available zscore is negative or positive. The stocks are also independently ranked on momentum and grouped into ten portfolios. Twenty portfolios are then formed at the intersections of momentum and z-score. Momentum is defined as the 11-month return from October year t-1 to August year t.
Portfolios in panel B are formed as follows: at the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2001, all the stocks in our sample are allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available zscore is negative or positive. The stocks are also independently ranked on market capitalization and grouped into ten portfolios. Twenty portfolios are then formed at the intersections of size and z-score.
Portfolios in panel C are formed as follows: at the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2001, all the stocks in our sample are allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available zscore is negative or positive. The stocks are also independently ranked on B/M and grouped into ten portfolios. Twenty portfolios are then formed at the intersections of B/M and z-score. B/M is computed as the ratio of book value of equity (excluding preference capital) plus deferred taxes less minority interests from the latest available financial statements, divided by the market value of equity on September 30th.
Portfolios Table 2 : Failure ra tes in four-way portfolios
At the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2001, all the stocks in our sample are ranked on market capitalization and grouped into two portfolios, independently ranked on B/M and grouped into three portfolios, independently ranked on prior-year return and grouped into two portfolios and, finally, separately allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available z-score is negative or positive. Twenty-four portfolios are then formed at the intersections of size, B/M, momentum and z-score. Portfolios in panel A are formed as follows: at the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2001, all the stocks in our sample are allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available zscore is negative or positive. The stocks are also independently ranked on market capitalization and grouped into ten portfolios. Twenty portfolios are then formed at the intersections of size and z-score.
Portfolios in panel B are formed as follows: at the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2001, all the stocks in our sample are allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available zscore is negative or positive. The stocks are also independently ranked on B/M and grouped into ten portfolios. Twenty portfolios are then formed at the intersections of B/M and z-score.
Portfolios in panel C are formed as follows: at the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2001, all the stocks in our sample are allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available zscore is negative or positive. The stocks are also independently ranked on momentum and grouped into ten portfolios. Twenty portfolios are then formed at the intersections of momentum and z-score. Momentum is defined as the monthly return averaged over the 11-month period from October year t-1 to August year t. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of September each year.
B/M is computed as the ratio of book value of equity (excluding preference capital) plus deferred taxes less minority interests from the latest available accounts divided by the market value of equity on September 30th. Average monthly excess return is the time series average of the difference between monthly stock returns and one -month Treasury bill rate observed at the beginning of the month. Portfolio betas are the sum of slopes in the regression of the return on a portfolio on the current, prior and next month's market returns. Average size, average B/M and average momentum are the time-series averages of monthly averages of market capitalizations, B/M and prior twelve month returns (excluding September) respectively for stocks in the portfolio at the end of September of each year. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last monthly return for failed stocks is set equal to -100%. At the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2001, all the stocks in our sample are ranked on market capitalization and grouped into two portfolios, independently ranked on B/M and grouped into three portfolios and independently ranked on prior year return and grouped into two portfolios. The stocks are also independently allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available z-score is negative or positive. Twenty-four portfolios are then formed at the intersections of size, B/M, momentum and zscore. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of September each year. B/M is computed as the ratio of book value of equity (excluding preference capital) plus deferred taxes less minority interests from the latest available accounts divided by the market value of equity on September 30th. Average monthly excess return is the time series average of the difference between monthly stock returns and one-month Treasury bill rate observed at the beginning of the month. Portfolio betas are the sum of slopes in the regression of the return on a portfolio on the current, prior and next month's market returns. Average size, average B/M and average momentum are the time -series averages of monthly averages of market capitalizations, B/M and prior 11-month average monthly returns (October year t-1 to August year t) respectively for stocks in the portfolio at the end of September of each year. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last monthly return for failed stocks is set equal to -100%. At the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2001, all the stocks in our sample are ranked on market capitalization and grouped into two portfolios, independently ranked on B/M and grouped into three portfolios and independently ranked on prior year return and grouped into two portfolios. The stocks are also independently allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available z-score is negative or positive. Twenty-four portfolios are then formed at the intersections of size, B/M, momentum and zscore. Portfolios are rebala nced at the end of September each year.
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B/M is computed as the ratio of book value of equity (excluding preference capital) plus deferred taxes less minority interests from the latest available accounts divided by the market value of equity on September 30th. To avoid undue influence of outliers on the regressions, the smallest and largest 1% of the observations on B/M are set equal to 0.01 and 0.99 fractiles respectively. Portfolio betas are the sum of slopes in the regression of the return on a portfolio on the current, prior and following month's market returns.
R it is the equally-weighted return on portfolio i during month t and R Ft is the one-month Treasury bill rate at the beginning of month t. β it-1 is the beta of portfolio i estimated at the portfolio formation date. ln(size it-1 ) and ln(B/M it-1 ) are the natural logarithms of average of market capitalizations and average of B/M ratios respectively of stocks in portfolio i at the portfolio formation date. Mom it-1 is the average monthly return over the 11 months from October year t-1 to August year t prior to the month of portfolio formation of all the stocks in portfolio i. z(0/1) it-1 is equal to 1 if the latest available z-score is negative, 0 otherwise. At the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2001, all the stocks in our sample are ranked on market capitalization and grouped into two portfolios, independently ranked on B/M and grouped into three portfolios and independently ranked on prior year return and grouped into two portfolios. The stocks are also independently allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available z-score is negative or positive. Twenty-four portfolios are then formed at the intersections of size, B/M, momentum and zscore. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of September each year.
R it is the equally-weighted return on portfolio i during month t and R Ft is the one-month Treasury bill rate at the beginning of month t. β it-1 is the beta of portfolio i estimated at the portfolio formation date. ln(size it-1 ) and ln(B/M it-1 ) are the natural logarithms of average of market capitalizations and average of B/M ratios respectively of stocks in portfolio i at the portfolio formation date. Mom it-1 is the average monthly return over the 11 months from October year t-1 to August year t prior to the month of portfolio formation of all the stocks in portfolio i. z(0/1) it-1 is equal to 1 if the latest available z-score is negative, 0 otherwise. The slopes are estimated by Fama-MacBeth cross-section regressions for each month in the lowest and highest quartile separately from October 1979 to September 2002. Figures in brackets are the respective t-statistics. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last period return for failed stocks is set equal to -100%.
The months when the expected market return is in the lowest quartile are classified down-market and the months when the expected market return is in the highest quartile are classified as up-market. At the end of September of each year from 1979 to 2001, all the stocks in our sample are ranked on market capitalization and grouped into two portfolios, independently ranked on B/M and grouped into three portfolios and independently ranked on prior year return and grouped into two portfolios. The stocks are also independently allocated to two groups based on whether their latest available z-score is negative or positive. Twenty-four portfolios are then formed at the intersections of size, B/M, momentum and zscore. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of September each year.
R it is the equally-weighted return on portfolio i during month t and R Ft is the one-month Treasury bill rate at the beginning of month t. β it-1 is the beta of portfolio i estimated at the portfolio formation date. ln(size it-1 ) and ln(B/M it-1 ) are the natural logarithms of average of market capitalizations and average of B/M ratios respectively of stocks in portfolio i at the portfolio formation date. Mom it-1 is the average monthly return over the 11-months from October of year t-1 to August of year t prior to the month of portfolio formation of all the stocks in portfolio i. z(0/1) it -1 is equal to 1 if the latest available z-score is negative, 0 otherwise. The slopes are estimated by Fama-MacBeth cross-section regressions for each month in the lowest and highest quartile separately from October 1979 to September 2002. Figures in brackets are the respective t-statistic s. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last period return for failed stocks is set equal to -100%.
The quarters when next quarter GDP growth rate is in the lowest 25% for our sample period are classified as down-turns and the quarters when next quarter GDP growth rate is in the highest 25% for our sample period are classified as up-turns. Negative B/M stocks are excluded for the portfolios. The last month return for failed stocks is set equal to -100%. 
